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Abstract 
As the Sino-U.S. relationship goes on a downward 
spiral, points of conflict have sparked at places one 
might not expect: antique sovereign bonds.  In recent 
years, the idea of making China pay for the sovereign 
bonds issued by its predecessor regimes a century ago 
have received increasing attention in the U.S.  This 
note takes this seeming strange idea seriously and 
maps out the possible legal issues surrounding a 
revival of these century-old bonds.  Although two 
particular bonds show some potential for revival—the 
Hukuang Railways 5% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds of 
1911 and the Pacific Development Loan of 1937—the 
private bondholders would unlikely be able to toll the 
statute of limitations on the repayment claims based 
on these bonds.  Even in the unlikely scenario that they 
succeed, the Chinese government would have an 
arsenal of contract law arguments against the 
enforcement of these bonds, most notably defenses 
based on duress, impracticality, and public policy.  By 
going into the details of the legal arguments and 
history behind these bonds, we seek to confirm the 
obvious, that is, the idea of making China pay for these 
bonds is as far-fetched as it sounds and would not be 
taken seriously by courts. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereigns live forever,1 but what about the money they owe?  
Over the years, the question of whether the United States can seek 
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repayment from a group of defaulted Chinese bonds issued before the 
People’s Republic of China’s inception has attracted attention from 
law professors,2 speculators,3 schemers,4 and potentially the Trump 
White House. 5   With the growing call to punish China for the 
COVID-19 pandemic rising inside the Beltway, even members of 
Congress have entertained the idea of compelling China to pay for 
these century-old bonds.  A concurrent resolution has even been 
introduced to Congress,6  driving the issue under the spotlight yet 
again.7  
What exactly are these bonds?  Before the Chinese 
Communist Party (the “CCP”) established the People’s Republic of 
China (the “P.R.C.”), its predecessors, the Qing Empire, and the 
succeeding Republic of China (the “R.O.C.”) under the Kuomintang 
(the “KMT”), both issued government bonds to Western investors 
from 1861 to 1949.  After the P.R.C. was founded in 1949, following 
the Soviet Union’s lead in repudiating the pre-communist era 
 
We would also like to thank Kate Dai, Yanchao Di, Robertson Dorsett, Tom Yu, 
Yiran Wang, and Larry Hong for their valuable comments and critiques.  Our 
gratitude also goes to the fantastic editors of the University of Pennsylvania Asian 
Law Review.  All errors are ours. 
1 See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 249 
(1906) (“A monarchy may be transformed into a republic, or a republic into a 
monarchy . . . though the government changes, the nation remains, with rights and 
obligations unimpaired.”). 
2 Joseph Cotterill, Back to the Future with Pari Passu, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 
5, 2013), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/11/05/1667042/back-to-the-future-with-
pari-passu/ [https://perma.cc/7ZPU-LS2C]. 
3 Mark Weidemaier, Pre-Revolutionary Chinese Debt: An Investment for 
the Truly Stable Genius, CREDIT SLIPS (July 21, 2019), 
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/07/pre-revolutionary-chinese-debt-
an-investment-for-the-truly-stable-genius.html [https://perma.cc/9X6P-GS6F]. 
4 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Prominent 
Pastor, Financial Planner in Scheme to Defraud Elderly Investors (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-51 [https://perma.cc/NP4U-LEXE]. 
5 Tracy Alloway, Trump’s New Trade War Tool Might Just Be Antique 
China Debt, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 29, 2009), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-29/trump-s-new-trade-war-
weapon-might-just-be-antique-china-debt [https://perma.cc/S9DG-A9KK]. 
6 S. Con. Res. 43, 116th Cong. (2020).  
7 Izabella Kaminska, Antique Chinese Bonds are Now in Play, FIN. 
TIMES (July 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/7a65b99c-e419-49da-bf47-
33acb91ed4a3 [https://perma.cc/B3EE-22UD].  
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obligations to the Western powers,8 the P.R.C. ceased all diplomatic 
relations with the West 9 and refused to recognize its predecessors’ 
sovereign debt obligations. 10   These bonds have since gone into 
default and have been left with only antique value.11  
This paper is an attempt to analyze this seemingly far-fetched 
idea in earnest.  The authors try to explore if a U.S. court would 
entertain the idea of ordering the present Chinese state to pay for its 
predecessors’ obligations, which, by some estimates, have accrued to 
worth just north of a trillion dollars.12  While courts have refused to 
do so several times in previous decades on a variety of grounds, 13 our 
 
8 Eric Toussaint, Russia: Origin and Consequences of the Debt 
Repudiation of February 10, 1918 (Feb. 15, 2021), COMM. FOR ABOLITION 
ILLEGITIMATE DEBT, http://www.cadtm.org/Russia-Origin-and-consequences-of-
the-debt-repudiation-of-February-10-1918 [https://perma.cc/3ED4-A455].  
9 See Mao Zedong, Former Chairman, P.R.C., Report to the Second 
Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (Mar. 5, 1949) (transcript available at 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-
4/mswv4_58.htm [https://perma.cc/4DTM-XZ4W]) (“We must . . . [r]efuse to 
recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel 
of the Kuomintang period. . .”). 
10 Caizheng Bu, Waijiao Bu Guanyu Chuli Woguo Jiu Zhengfu Faxing de 
Gongzhaiquan Wenti de Tongzhi (财政部、外交部关于处理我国旧政府发行的
公债券问题的通知) [Joint Announcement by the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Public Debts Issued by the Former Regimes] 
(Jan. 8, 1982), 
https://www.chinaacc.com/new/63/64/80/2006/3/ca247397581360022628-0.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZP88-EATS] [hereinafter Joint Announcement] (confirming the 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China’s policy since 1953 on 
repudiating payment for any public debt issued by the Republic of China and the 
Qing Empire).  See DAI XUEWEN (戴学文), CONG TAIWAN HAIFANG JIEKUAN 
DAO AIGUO GONGZHAI, LISHU ZAOQI ZHONGGUO DUIWAI ZHAIQUAN, 1974–1949 
(从台湾海防借款到爱国公债：历数早期中国对外公债, 1874–1949) [From the 
Taiwan Defense Bond to the Patriotic Bond: A Collection of Foreign Debt in 
China, 1874–1949] 315 (2017) (offering a full Chinese Translation of the Pacific 
Development Loan).  See also JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE’S 
CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW; A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 681–82 (1974). 
11 See Kaminska, supra note 7 (discussing how the value of the antique 
Chinese bonds has changed over time).  
12 See Alloway, supra note 5. 
13 See, e.g., Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 
1494–95, 1497–99 (11th Cir. 1986), Morris v. People’s Republic of China, 478 F. 
Supp. 2d 561, 566–73 (S.D.N.Y 2007); Pons v. People’s Republic of China, 666 
F. Supp. 2d 406, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (showing how courts have either punted or 
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goal in this paper is to examine whether they would change their 
position in light of recent developments in law and, if so, what 
defenses would be available. 
The authors address two categories of legal issues in this 
paper: Whether the P.R.C. could (1) procedurally and (2) 
substantively challenge a bondholder-plaintiff’s lawsuit against it.  
Procedural challenges include issues of jurisdictional reach of U.S. 
courts and the statute of limitations. 14   Although there are two 
particular bonds that have a higher chance of surviving the 
jurisdictional challenge, they are very unlikely to survive the statute 
of limitations challenge. 
The substantive issues, however, are unsatisfactorily 
answered by existing legal precedent.  This paper does not seek to 
provide any definitive answers, but only to illustrate that even in the 
unlikely scenario of a plaintiff-bondholder circumventing the 
procedural hurdles, she would still have to face further challenges 
against her recovery on substantive grounds.  Arguments against the 
enforcement of these bonds are rooted in traditional contract law 
arguments—duress, impracticability, and public policy.  
The rest of the paper is presented in the following order:  
Section II concerns the two relevant procedural issues, Section III 
focuses on the substantive issues against the enforcement of these 
bonds, and Section VI concludes. 
II. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES: JURISDICTION & 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
To survive the P.R.C.’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff-
bondholders will have two major procedural barriers to overcome.  
 
dismissed suits regarding debt held by the P.R.C. as the successor state to 
previous regimes in China). 
14 Several academic articles have addressed this topic:  Mark 
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Enough With the Old Chinese Debt Already, CREDIT 
SLIPS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/09/enough-
with-the-old-chinese-debt-already.html [https://perma.cc/ZD2Q-MUGD]; see also 
Michael Chen et al., The Emperor’s Old Bond 2–8 (Mar. 20, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544241 
[https://perma.cc/RNT3-FM3V]) (examining jurisdictional challenges to the 
collection of the old Chinese bonds). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/3
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First, the bondholders must establish that U.S. courts have 
jurisdiction over the P.R.C. for their bond claims.  Second, they must 
establish that the statute of limitations has not lapsed on these claims.  
After examining all historical bonds issued by the pre-P.R.C. 
governments that we could find, we identified two specific bonds—
the Hukuang Railways 5% Sinking Fund Gold Bonds issued in 1911 
by multiple U.S. banks (the “Hukuang Bond”), and the Secured 
Sinking Bond Fund of 1937, also known as the Pacific Development 
Loan of 1937 (the “PDL”)—that have the potential to overcome the 
jurisdictional barrier.  Our discussion in this paper is based on the 
language in the indentures of these two bonds because they provide 
the strongest case for the bondholders to survive a motion to dismiss 
compared to a few dozen other bonds issued in the same era.  Our 
discussion also assumes that the P.R.C. is the sole legitimate 
successor to inherit all rights and obligations of the Qing Empire and 
the R.O.C.,15 as has always been the position of both the P.R.C. and 
the U.S.16  Therefore, we will not include any potential involvement 
of the Taiwanese government in our discussion, a topic intricate 
enough to merit its own paper. 
Jurisdictional Barrier: Sovereign Immunity 
The first hurdle bondholders must overcome is to establish 
jurisdiction over the P.R.C.  While in past cases courts had held that 
a U.S. court does not have jurisdiction over foreign governments,17 
the Hukuang Bond and the PDL are particularly susceptible to suit 
 
15 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Relations with Taiwan, Bilateral Relations Feet Sheet (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/https://www.state.gov/u-s-
relations-with-taiwan/ [https://perma.cc/8GQV-9VL4].  
16 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 209(2) (AM. L. INST. 
1987) (noting that rights and obligations of the predecessor state are transferred to 
the successor state). 
17 See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 147 (1812) 
(holding that a French warship was immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts).  
See also Richard Parker, China's Secret? It Owes Americans Nearly $1 trillion, 
OREGONIAN (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/2012/05/chinas_secret_it_owes_american.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/P8X6-KVV8] (explaining that investors who tried to sue the 
Chinese government in the 1980s and 1990s often failed because the law back 
then provided that U.S. courts do not have jurisdiction over foreign governments). 
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for repayment issues in light of the more restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity adopted by the U.S. in the 1952 Tate Letter.18  
The notion of absolute sovereign immunity has gradually 
declined in relevance as Western governments have turned to a more 
restrictive version of sovereign immunity.19  The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (1976) (“FSIA”) has codified the U.S. version of the 
restrictive theory.20  Under the FSIA, foreign sovereigns will be held 
accountable for their commercial activities so long as those activities 
have a connection to the U.S.  The connection can be established if 
the action is based upon (1) a commercial activity carried on in the 
U.S. by a foreign state; (2) an act performed in the U.S. in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or (3) an 
act outside the U.S. in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the U.S.21  While 
Congress seems to have left defining the connectivity requirement to 
courts on a case-by-case basis, a congressional committee report does 
demonstrate its intent through a list of examples, showing that 
indebtedness incurred by a sovereign that negotiates or executes a 
loan agreement in the U.S may create the connection required under 
the FSIA.22  In short, the issuance of bonds to U.S. investors is likely 
to be viewed as within the range of commercial activity that 
establishes the necessary connection to the U.S.  
Furthermore, in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Supreme 
Court reversed the old rule laid out in Jackson v. The People’s 
Republic of China, 23  allowing for the FSIA to be applied 
retroactively. 24   This means that a sovereign no longer enjoys 
 
18 See Letter from Jack Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Sec’y of State, to 
Philip Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 
DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter the Tate Letter] (“The Department [of 
State] has now reached the conclusion that [sovereign] immunity should no longer 
be granted in certain types of cases.”). 
19 Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the Sovereign Out of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 
YALE J. INT’L L. 489, 490 (1992). 
20 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (“[S]tates are not immune from the jurisdiction of 
foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned . . . .”). 
21 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
22 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1487, at 17 (1976). 
23 Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497–99 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
24 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol16/iss3/3
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absolute immunity in cases brought before U.S. domestic courts, 
regardless of when the underlying activity happened.25  U.S. courts 
now would have subject matter jurisdiction in the event in which one 
of the exceptions laid out in the FSIA is triggered.  
In two early cases related to pre-P.R.C. Chinese bonds, 
Morris and Pons, plaintiff-bondholders, who were U.S. citizens, 
purchased the bonds on the secondary market.26  There, no U.S. bank 
participated in the initial issuance of the bonds, and loan repayments 
by the Chinese government were not paid to U.S. banks.27 Instead, 
these bonds were only redeemable at issuing banks outside of the 
U.S.28  As a result, the court held that the acts did not have substantial 
contact with the U.S. sufficient to establish liability of the Chinese 
government for commercial activities.29  
Unlike Morris and Pons, bondholders of the Hukuang Bond 
and the PDL will likely succeed in establishing substantial connection 
to the U.S. under the FSIA.  First, for the PDL, the underlying 
commercial activity was arguably carried out in the U.S. by a foreign 
state, meeting the first exception to sovereign immunity under the 
FSIA.  The issuing bank negotiated the terms of the bond directly 
with the Chinese government in the U.S. (at a company called Pacific 
Development Corp.) and the bond was listed in U.S. currency.30  
Second, the PDL provides one additional fact that further 
supports the finding of a connection to the U.S.  The place of 
performance of this bond (i.e., the recoupment of the principal) was 
designated as J.P. Morgan in New York.31  This scenario is similar to 
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., where, because Argentina 
designated New York as the place of repayment on the bonds and 
made some interest payments to New York accounts before 
defaulting, the court found a connection to the U.S. for the purpose 
 
25 Altmann, 541 U.S. at 698 (noting that many of the provisions under 
FSIA unquestionably apply to cases arising out of conduct that occurred before 
1976). 
26 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 564–65; Pons v. People’s Republic of 
China, 666 F. Supp. 2d, at 409. 
27 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 570. 
28 Id. at 564. 
29 Id. at 570–71. 
30 See DAI, supra note 10, at 175, 315 (stating that the bond was signed 
by the Chinese ambassador to United States and showing that the bond was listed 
in U.S. currency in a full Chinese translation of PDL).  
31 Id. at 175. 
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of applying the FSIA exception and piercing the immunity shield.32  
While the American citizenship of the bondholders is not in itself 
sufficient for courts to decide that the effect was “felt” in the U.S.,33 
the place of signing and performance together with the identity of the 
issuing bank in our case is likely sufficient to locate the effect in the 
U.S.34 
Third, for the Hukuang bond, even though it was negotiated 
and signed in Paris,35 the direct effect test could likely be met since 
the bond was issued by a bank syndicate including four American 
banks, including J.P. Morgan & Co., and the principal amount was 
split equally among the four participating states.36  Since U.S. banks 
actively participated in the initial issuance of the bond and were the 
counterparties entitled to the contractual obligations, the breach of 
those obligations had a direct effect in the U.S.  In sum, for both bonds, 
it would be hard for the P.R.C. to claim the immunity defense under 
the FSIA. 
One potential counterargument available to the P.R.C. is the 
one it made in Jackson.  There, China argued that the U.S. cannot 
abrogate the long-accepted international law principle of absolute 
sovereign immunity by changing its domestic laws.37  However, this 
argument suffers from several flaws.  To begin with, while the 
Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana that international law 
is “part of our law,”38 scholars have noted that, in application, what 
 
32 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992). 
33 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 569–71 (holding that plaintiff suffered no 
"direct effect in the United States" sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the 
commercial activity exception of the FSIA, the court noted that 
“the only evidence of a nexus with the United States clearly presented to the court 
is plaintiff's citizenship . . . . No issuing banks were located in the United States . . 
. . The P.R.C. had no designated agent to administer the bonds in the United 
States.  No negotiations concerning the bond issuance or payment occurred within 
the United States.  The bonds were not issued or payable in U.S. currency.  And, 
importantly, the contractually designated locations where payments of principal 
and interest were to be paid were all in cities outside the United States.”). 
34 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992). 
35 Id. at 112. 
36 Id.  
37 Jackson v. China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (11th Cir.1986). 
38 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is 
part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice 
of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are 
duly presented for their determination.”). 
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this means is ambiguous due to twentieth-century developments in 
the relationship between customary international law (“CIL”) and 
U.S. domestic law.39  Consequently, even assuming that there is a 
material difference between the FSIA and CIL, a U.S. domestic court 
will likely avoid applying international law, especially when CIL is 
in conflict with U.S. statutes.  When there is a direct conflict between 
the two, courts have concluded that the U.S. statutes prevail.40  
Furthermore, CIL has also evolved to treat commercial 
activity as one category of exceptions to sovereign immunity.  The 
U.N. General Assembly clarified this principle when it adopted the 
U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property.41  The Convention, although not yet in force, recognizes a 
general immunity for states with certain exceptions similar to those 
stated in the FSIA.42  Thus, regardless of the applicable law, U.S. 
domestic courts will likely apply a more restrictive sovereign 
immunity standard and assert jurisdiction over the P.R.C.  
Admittedly, there have been slight differences between the 
FSIA and CIL, and the question of which law should apply to our 
current case may seem to make a difference to the bondholders.  It is 
true that changes in the FSIA are now retroactive, whereas changes 
in CIL are not and thus inapplicable to prior transactions.43  Also, if 
CIL were to be applied, the P.R.C. could further argue that it is a 
persistent objector to the particular CIL related to the immunity 
defense and should therefore not be subject to its standards.44  The 
 
39 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary 
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 852–55 (1997) (“After Erie . . . a federal court can no 
longer apply [customary international law] in the absence of some domestic 
authorization to do so, as it could under the regime of general common law.”). 
40 See, e.g., Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 
2005) (“[C]lear congressional action trumps customary international law . . . .”). 
41 G.A. Res. 59/38, annex, Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property, at 3–7 (Dec. 2, 2004).  
42 Id. at 4–7.  
43 See generally Antoine Buyse, A Lifeline in Time—Non-Retroactivity 
and Continuing Violations under the ECHR, 75 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 63, 64–66, 70–
73 (2006) (showing that the European Court of Human Rights, in accordance with 
common practice in international law, has adopted a non-retroactivity principle).  
44 See Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in 
International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (2005) (“The 
doctrine of the persistent objector (“the doctrine”) limits the enforceability of 
international laws.  According to the doctrine, if a state persistently objects to the 
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P.R.C.’s past insistence on invoking the odious debt doctrine, which 
relieves the successor regime from inheriting its corrupt 
predecessor’s debt,45 can be viewed as such evidence of it being a 
persistent objector.  While it has always been controversial, the 
odious debt doctrine is at least recognized by the international 
community.46  As noted above, however, it is well established that an 
Congressional act can effectively control what role an international 
doctrine or a CIL rule such as the odious debt doctrine and the 
persistent objector rule plays in the U.S. legal system.47  Moreover, 
U.S. courts have not recognized the odious debt doctrine.48  Since the 
courts under discussion here are U.S. domestic courts which will 
likely apply U.S. law, the potential difference between CIL and the 
FSIA resulting from the retroactivity aspect and the ability of a nation 
to withdraw from CIL becomes moot.49  In sum, on the facts of our 
case, bondholders are likely able to establish jurisdiction over the 
P.R.C.   
 
development of a customary international law, it cannot be held to that law when 
the custom ripens.”). 
45 James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal 
Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 197–98 (2007).  
See also Bucheit et al, supra note 8, at 1208 (noting that the new citizens who are 
going to inherit unpaid debt from previous regime are victims of the linear 
progression of time). 
46 Feinerman, supra note 45, at 208–218.  
47 See STEPHEN P. MILLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL 32528 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW (2018) 
(“Congress is likely to continue to play a critical role in shaping the role of 
international law in the U.S. legal system in the future.”).   
48 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L.§ 209(2) (AM. L. INST. 
1987) (noting that rights and obligations of the predecessor state are transferred to 
the successor state). 
49 See William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International 
Law: Some Lessons from History, 120 YALE L. J. 169 (2010) (explaining that a 
more permissible view towards withdrawal from CIL would not make a legale 
difference but only gives a foreign country the right to complain diplomatically 
about a retroactive change in the rules). 
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Statute of Limitations: the Pari Passu déjà vu 
Under the FSIA, the law of the forum state defines the length 
of time of the applicable statute of limitations.50  Because there was 
no choice-of-law clause in the original Chinese bonds, we must first 
determine the forum state where the bondholders are likely to bring 
the lawsuit against the P.R.C.  New York would be the likely forum 
for such a lawsuit because the case law there provides the strongest 
argument for a bondholder-plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations. 
A federal court sitting in New York applies New York’s 
“borrowing statute” for statute of limitations issues arising from bond 
indentures.51  New York law provides that the bondholder’s claim 
against the P.R.C. would be time-barred six years after the bond’s 
maturity.52  For the Hukuang bond and the PDL, this would be 195753 
and 1960,54 respectively.  Therefore, the statute of limitations would 
have long passed unless the bondholders could find a way to toll the 
statute of limitations. 
The bondholders’ strongest argument for tolling the statute of 
limitations is to argue that the P.R.C. has been continuously 
breaching the pari passu clause in the bond indentures every time it 
had serviced its other debt instruments.  New York law provides that, 
if a contract requires “continuing performance over a period of time, 
each successive breach may begin the statute of limitations running 
anew.”55  This means that each time the P.R.C. breaches the bond 
indenture by making a payment, the statute of limitations restarts, and 
 
50 See Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 571 (“When a claim is brought under 
the FSIA, the law of the forum state determines whether plaintiff’s claim is time-
barred.”). 
51 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202(5) (Consol. 2021) (determining which statute of 
limitations will be applied); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (Consol. 2021) (providing 
that an action brought pursuant to a contractual obligation or liability must be 
commenced within six years); Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 571 (“A federal court 
sitting in New York will apply New York’s ‘borrowing statute,’ N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
§202.”) (citation omitted). 
52 Morris, 478 F. Supp. 2d, at 572. 
53 See Jackson v. China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1492 (determining that the 
Hukuang bonds matured in 1951). 
54 See DAI, supra note 10, at 315 (documenting that the PDL matures in 
1954, six years after which is 1960).  
55 Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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the bondholders would be able to bring the otherwise time-barred 
claims against the P.R.C. 
Therefore, in order to toll the statute of limitations, the 
bondholders must prove that the P.R.C. had breached these old bonds 
at least once in the past six years.  For this purpose, the Second 
Circuit’s two decisions in favor of NML Capital as the holder of the 
Argentine sovereign bond (the “NML cases”) would be their best 
precedents.56  
The NML cases are useful for the bondholders because of 
their interpretation of the Equal Treatment Provision (i.e., its pari 
passu clause) in the Argentine Fiscal Agency Agreement (“FAA”).57  
The Second Circuit found that Argentina breached the Equal 
Treatment Provision of its old bond in a debt restructuring effort 
through debt exchange by taking three actions:  “(1) defaulting on the 
[old] Bonds, (2) enacting legislation [“the Lock Law”] specifically 
forbidding future payment on them, and (3) continuing to pay interest 
on subsequently issued debt . . . .”58  
The P.R.C., however, would have a better chance of refuting 
the claim than Argentina had for two reasons.  First, the language in 
the two Chinese bond indentures contains less restrictive covenants.  
Second, the Second Circuit’s holding is very narrow.  As the Second 
Circuit made clear, it did not rule on whether either (i) paying one 
creditor and not another or (ii) enacting a law disparately affecting a 
group of creditors’ rights would alone constitute a breach of the pari 
 
56 NML Cap. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Cap. v. 
Argentina, 727 F3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).  
57 The authors recognize the difference between the pari passu clause 
contained in the Argentine FAA and the first priority protection found in the 
Chinese bond, which may render different treatments offered by the court in its 
application of the NML cases.  While it is beyond this paper’s scope to discuss 
the litigation strategy in this regard, it is an important point worth addressing at 
the actual litigation planning stage. 
For the specific language of the Equal Treatment Provision being 
violated, see NML Cap. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d at 251 (“The Securities will 
constitute . . . direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of 
the Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference among 
themselves.  The payment obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at 
all times rank at least equally with all its other present and future unsecured and 
unsubordinated External Indebtedness.”). 
58 NML Cap. v. Argentina, 727 F.3d at 237. 
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passu clause.59   It was important for the Second Circuit that the 
combination and accumulation of these three actions caused a breach 
of the pari passu clause.60  In fact, the Second Circuit even noted that 
these three factors appearing together are so extraordinary that it 
made Argentina a “uniquely recalcitrant” debtor, a scenario that the 
court found as “unlikely to occur in the future”.61  Therefore, the 
P.R.C. can distinguish the language contained in its bond indentures 
from the Argentine FAA’s and ask the court to adopt a narrow reading 
of the NML cases and their progeny.62   
The bondholders may argue that the P.R.C. has been 
breaching the first priority clause found in the Hukuang Bond and the 
PDL.  The Hukuang Bond provides that, if the principle and the 
interest are not paid in full, the bondholders will have a security 
interest in the tax revenue of the provinces of Hubei and Hunan that 
enjoys a priority over all future loans, and the government shall not 
incur any indebtedness or guarantee any indebtedness using the same 
collateral.63   For the purpose of this article, we assume that this 
provision effectively puts a security interest of first priority on the 
Chinese Government’s tax revenue, because every Chinese central 
government collects taxes from its provinces, including Hubei and 
Hunan.64  Similar but with less restriction, the PDL provides that the 
 
59 Id. at 247. 
60 See id. (“[W]e have not held that a sovereign debtor breaches its pari 
passu clause every time it pays one creditor and not another, or even every time it 
enacts a law disparately affecting a creditor’s rights.  We simply affirm the 
district court’s conclusion that Argentina’s extraordinary behavior was a violation 
of the particular pari passu clause found in the FAA.”) (citations omitted).  
61 Id. 
62 See Lee C. Buchheit, The Pari Passu Fallacy—Requiescat in Pace 3 
(Jan. 24, 2018) (on file at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3108862 
[https://perma.cc/NF66-XWP5]) (describing a case where the facts reflect those in 
NML but, without the Lock Law, no breach of the pari passu clause was found); 
see also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt after 
NML v Argentina, 12 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 224, 226–27 (2017) (arguing that future 
cases standing on the NML precedent may go either way depending on how 
similar the fact-specific factors are between the cases).   
63 See DAI, supra note 10, at 273 (discussing the Chinese translation of 
the Hukuang bond, which states the priority enjoyed over future loans). 
64 Other commentators have made similar observations; see Michael 
Chen et al., The Emperor’s Old Bonds, at 6–7 (Mar. 20, 2020) (unpublished 
manuscript) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544241 
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bond has a first priority lien on the salt tax revenue of the Chinese 
government, and enjoys priority over all future loans collateralized 
by the salt tax revenue.  There is no restriction on the future 
incurrence of new debt.65  
The bondholders may further argue that, because the P.R.C. 
refused to inherit these old bonds while paying for new sovereign 
debt as recently as October 2020, the P.R.C. has effectively 
subordinated these old bonds and breached the covenants that granted 
them the highest priority.66  The bondholders may add that the P.R.C. 
has breached an even more stringent condition than that of the Equal 
Treatment Provision in Argentina’s FAA because the Equal 
Treatment Provision only provides a requirement of equal treatment, 
not the highest priority.67  Therefore, an argument can be made that 
the P.R.C.’s violation of the first priority clause would be more 
outrageous than that of the Argentine FAA and therefore render the 
P.R.C. a uniquely recalcitrant debtor.68  
This argument is not likely to succeed.  For the PDL, the 
language of the indenture suggests that as long as the Chinese 
government has not been granting a first priority security interest to 
other creditors in the same collateral—the salt tax revenue—there 
would not be any subsequent breach for the purpose of tolling the 
statute of limitations.69  Having a first priority in a collateral does not 
by itself gives a loan a seniority position in terms of payment.70  For 
the Hukuang bond, the language suggests that there will be a 
 
[https://perma.cc/RNT3-FM3V]) (reasoning that the security interest in the 
“Provincial Revenues” of the Hukuang Bond “could be analogized to a present-
day tax on or relating to the province of Hubei.”). 
65 Id. at 316. 
66 See Hudson Lockett & Thomas Hale, Beijing’s First Bond Offer to US 
Investors Draws Record Demand, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2020), 
https://www.ft.com/content/c1e8897c-32a5-402d-837a-ba7df135c069 
[https://perma.cc/5EDA-QXQT] (noting the P.R.C. began selling debt to US 
buyers in mid-October, 2020). 
67 For the language of the Equal Treatment Clause, see supra note 57. 
68 See Michael et al., supra note 14, at 9–10 (noting that the P.R.C. has 
engaged in preferential treatment for nearly half a century since 1949). 
69 See supra note 60. 
70 The “first in time first in right” rule under UCC Article 9 will only 
apply to conflicting security interests in the same collateral.  Between a creditor 
having a first priority interest in collateral A and another creditor having a first 
priority in collateral B, there is no prescribed order of payment if there is no 
separate provision restricting payment on other debt.  U.C.C. § 9-322(a). 
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subsequent breach only if the government has been granting a first 
priority interest in the same collateral or incurring any new debt.  
Making selective payments to other creditors in itself does not trigger 
a breach.  Both bonds have less restrictive provisions than those in 
the NML cases, and it will be harder for the bondholders to establish 
a subsequent breach. 
Admittedly, the indentures we found thus far by researching 
on a secondary source might only present part of the entire 
agreements.  Moreover, the bondholders of the Hukuang bond may 
be able to show that the Chinese government has been incurring some 
new debt.71  The P.R.C., however, can take advantage of the Second 
Circuit’s narrow reading of the NML cases since White Hawthorne, 
LLC v. Republic of Argentina to distinguish itself from the unique 
situation of Argentina. 
In fact, the cases following the NML decisions took the 
language on the uniqueness of Argentina seriously.  The district judge 
of the NML cases, Judge Griesa of the Southern District of New York, 
has held in White Hawthorne that, at least absent the “Lock-Law style” 
legislative action, the bare government decision to pay some creditors 
but not others does not constitute a breach of the pari passu clause.72  
Such reasoning has been adopted by other federal judges in New 
York,73 including the Second Circuit as recently as March 2020.74  
Leading experts have argued that the pari passu argument used 
 
71 The chances for the bondholders of the two bonds to be able to show 
the Chinese government has been granting first priority interests in the two kinds 
of collateral is very thin and thus the authors assume away this possibility in this 
paper.  We, of course, welcome any historical evidence to show the opposite.  
72 White Hawthorne, LLC v. Republic of Arg., No. 16-cv-1042(TPG), 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177895, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016).  
73 Bugliotti v. Republic of Arg., 952 F.3d 410, 415 (2d Cir. 2020); Bison 
Bee LLC v. Republic of Arg., 778 F. App’x 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2019). 
74 Bison Bee LLC v. Republic of Argentina , No. 18-CV-3446, 2018 WL 
2018WL 8058126, at *3 (S.D.N.Y Oct 22, 2018) (stating that a breach of pari 
passu clause requires Argentine to commit “extraordinary conduct”); Ajdler v 
Province of Mendoza, No. 17-CV-1530, 2017 WL 36351222, at *10 (S.D.N.Y 
Aug 2, 2017) (confirming that a breach of pari passu clause could not be found 
unless the facts in the current case are “substantially similar” to the extraordinary 
conduct in the NML cases). 
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against Argentina in the NML cases has become essentially toothless 
after White Hawthorne.75  
Two caveats, however, remain in the Second Circuit’s later 
narrow reading of the pari passu argument:  (1) these appellate cases 
are unreported, thus providing limited precedential value and 
preserving NML as relevant case law; (2) the pari passu argument is 
ultimately based on state law and the possibility remains that the 
Second Circuit would be bound by state court’s view on this 
argument.  Therefore, the pari passu may still have a spark of life. 
The P.R.C., however, can take advantage of the Second 
Circuit’s narrow reading of NML since White Hawthorne.  To begin 
with, not all three elements present in the NML cases that make 
Argentina uniquely recalcitrant exist in the case against the P.R.C.:  
although the P.R.C. government defaulted on these bonds and has 
been issuing and paying off new bonds, the P.R.C. legislators have 
never passed formal legislation subordinating the debt it renounced.  
The National People’s Congress, the P.R.C.’s legislative body, has 
never passed legislation like the Lock Law enacted by the Argentine 
legislature.  Rather, the decision on repudiating these debts was made 
by the executive branch of the government alone through a decree.76  
This would help distinguish the P.R.C. from Argentina in the NML 
cases in the eyes of the Second Circuit, which held that any missing 
element from the original NML cases fact pattern—here, the absence 
of legislation—would deny the finding of a breach of the first priority 
clause.77  
As a counterargument, bondholders can try to establish that 
the P.R.C. in fact did enact a law like the Lock Law.  They might 
argue that the P.R.C. has no effectual separation of powers when it 
renounced the debt in 1953, and that the decrees of the executive 
branch should be viewed as de facto legislation because they are 
 
75 See Buchheit & Cruz, supra note 62, at 3–4 (stating that without 
aggravating factors, discriminatory payment alone does not constitute a breach of 
a pari passu clause). 
76 See Joint Announcement, supra note 10 (confirming State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China’s policy since 1953 on repudiating payment for 
any public debt issued by the Republic of China); see also Morris v. People's 
Republic of China, 478 F.Supp.2d 561, 563 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the 
commercial activity exception was inapplicable because there was no direct effect 
in the United States). 
77 Bugliotti, 952 F.3d at 415; Bison Bee LLC, 778 F. App’x at 73. 
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“policy-laws” and have the same legal effect as any formal legislation 
under Mao’s P.R.C.78  As one commentator puts it, “[u]nder Mao, 
policy alone as articulated and applied by [the CCP] had directed and 
guided the entire Chinese Party-state, and legislation had been used 
only formalistically to declare policy.”79  An argument can be made 
that the absence of Lock Law-like legislation when the P.R.C. 
denounced its obligation was a mere formality, and substantively, the 
P.R.C. in 1953 was just as recalcitrant as Argentina to legally 
forbiding fulfilling its obligations.  Making an argument through 
analyzing the nature of the Chinese Constitution, though not 
unprecedented,80  would be extremely unconventional as it would 
require a federal court to review the P.R.C.’s political structure and 
constitution in 1953, a task that courts are reluctant to undertake.81  
Other commentators have noticed that bondholders may argue 
that the P.R.C. has established a much longer pattern of 
uncooperative behavior than Argentina and thus could more likely be 
characterized as a “uniquely recalcitrant” debtor. 82   However, 
assuming that the odious debt doctrine cited by the P.R.C.,83 though 
not a recognized defense, at least morally stands for justice for the 
oppressed, the P.R.C. may appear to be much less outrageous or even 
justified in declaring those old debts void.84  
 
78 For more detailed discussion on the legal significance of the policy-
laws in China and their development from the Mao era to the 2000s, see generally 
Litong Chen, Chinese Policy Laws and Separation of Powers, 1 U. PA. E. ASIA L. 
REV. 49 (2005). 
79 Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty 
Years, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 384 (2000).  
80 See Trans. Chem. Ltd. v. China Nat. Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 978 F. 
Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (analyzing independently the Chinese Constitution 
and Codes in addition to affidavits from three experts). 
81 Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in 
U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 887, 896–9 (2012).  
82 See Chen et al., supra note 14, at 8–9 (noting that the P.R.C. has 
engaged in preferential treatment for nearly half a century since 1949). 
83 Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11 Cir. 
1986) (“PRC maintains that under 
the principle of non-liability for ‘odious debts’ China bears no 
responsibility for the bonds.”). 
84 In the next section, this paper will offer a more detailed discussion on 
the odious debt doctrine regarding whether it could potentially function as an 
adequate defense in U.S. courts, see infra Section III.  
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The P.R.C. also renounced the obligations of its predecessors 
under very different circumstances from that of Argentina.  For one, 
it was impractical for the P.R.C. to pay the American bondholders 
back in the early 1950s. 85   From 1945 to 1949, the Chinese 
Communist Party had been fighting a civil war with the then R.O.C. 
government who was receiving monetary support from the U.S.  Just 
a year after the war, in 1950, the newly established P.R.C. engaged 
in a direct military conflict with the U.S. in Korea and the Seventh 
Fleet entered the Taiwan Strait to neutralize the P.R.C.’s attempt to 
attack the exiled R.O.C. forces in Taiwan.86  It  was absurd for the 
dirt-poor early P.R.C. to pay the Americans, who had sponsored the 
regime the P.R.C. had overthrown in a brutal civil war and was now 
fighting the P.R.C. themselves.  In the eyes of the P.R.C., it had shed 
blood to get rid of the strings from Western colonial powers, a 
situation that couldn’t be more different from that of Argentina, a 
willing and frequent participant of the modern global capital 
market.87 
Furthermore, the P.R.C. and Argentina are very different 
debtors today.  The debt in the NML case was issued and defaulted 
by the same regime that rules Argentina, and Argentina has been 
repeatedly unable to honor its obligations in the U.S. capital market.  
In fact, Argentina just defaulted the ninth time early this year.88  It 
makes sense for the Second Circuit to deal with one extraordinary 
market participant with extraordinary solutions.  The P.R.C., on the 
other hand, is current on all its sovereign debt obligations to U.S. 
investors and has maintained a history of doing so.  The debt 
defaulted on was not issued by the same regime and was from a 
century ago.  It would make little sense for a New York court to 
 
85 In fact, we think the P.R.C. may cite common law impracticality as 
defense against the validly of these bonds, see infra Section III.C. 
86 Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, 1 PUB. PAPERS 
173 (June 27, 1950). 
87 See Ben Bartenstein, Sydney Makim & Marisa Gertz, One Country, 
Nine Defaults: Argentina Is Caught in a Vicious Cycle, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2019-09-11/one-country-
eight-defaults-the-argentine-debacles?sref=LTGwPLw9. 
88 Nicole Alcoba, Argentina Defaults Again as Debt Talks Progress, AL 
JAZEERA (May 22, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/argentina-defaults-
debt-talks-progress-200522212222639.html [https://perma.cc/9HTF-9634]. 
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enforce the law, which was specifically curated for Argentina, against 
the P.R.C.  
Finally, the policy rationale behind the statute of limitations 
falls on the P.R.C.’s side.  Allowing the NML type argument to toll 
the statute of limitations against the P.R.C. would make these bonds 
from a century ago never expire as long as the Chinese government 
is paying for its public debt. 89   This implies that the statute of 
limitations may never run depending on how the contract was 
drafted,90 the exact scenario that the statute of limitations was created 
to avoid in order to save public resources and ensure equitable 
outcomes.91  One could argue that the judiciary should not waste 
public resources on rejuvenating stale claims.92  The antique Chinese 
bonds are probably the best example of stale claims that are still 
afforded attention from the public discourse.  It would be a good 
public policy to let these claims find their peace. 
In sum, the PDL bondholders seem to be out of luck, unless 
they can dig some gold out of the muddy history related to the salt tax 
revenue.  If the Hukuang bondholders can establish successive 
breaches by the P.R.C. within the six-year timeframe leading up to 
the litigation because of the issuance of new sovereign debts, they 
could have a chance to establish that the P.R.C. has been continuously 
breaching the restriction on incurring new debt found in the Hukuang 
bond under the NML standard.93  This would theoretically allow the 
statute of limitations to be renewed every time a new bond is issued, 
and thus bondholders may have a chance to bring the lawsuit to court 
today.  However, the bondholders are not likely to succeed in light of 
 
89 A wonderful point made by Professor Weidemaier in his podcast; see 
Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Episode Two of Clauses and Controversies: 




90 Id.   
91 Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 351, 360 (1828). 
92 Id.   
93 The P.R.C. started issuing treasury bonds in 1988.  See Haizhou 
Huang & Ning Zhu, The Chinese Bond Market: Historical Lessons, Present 
Challenges and Future Perspectives 25 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at http://depot.som.yale.edu/icf/papers/fileuploads/2582/original/07-
04.pdf [https://perma.cc/65QD-HV3P]) (providing an overview of the history and 
current challenges facing the Chinese bond market). 
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the Second Circuit’s recent rulings on the pari passu issue, the very 
different circumstances surrounding the P.R.C. and Argentina’s debts, 
and the policy rationale behind having a statute of limitations in the 
first place.  
III. SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES: CONTRACT LAW 
DEFENSE 
The authors recognize the uncertainty brought by 
international law argument and the odious debt doctrine in a U.S. 
court. Therefore, this section introduces defenses that are more 
appealing to a federal court—New York contract law.  Due to the 
different circumstances surrounding the issuance of these two bonds, 
we found two different lines of common law defense for potential 
litigation over the two bonds, respectively.  
For the Hukuang Bond, the P.R.C. could invoke duress 
because of the precarious situation the Qing Empire was in during its 
last decades.  The PDL, however, was issued not by the Qing Empire, 
but by the R.O.C.94 as part of its effort to reorganize its sovereign debt 
with colonial powers, specifically, the U.S. Unlike the Qing Empire, 
the R.O.C. in 1937 was not in as precarious of a situation.  Although 
it faced a looming military threat from Japan, which had annexed 
Manchuria since 1931, the R.O.C. in 1937 was on track to becoming 
a modern state with a growing economy and even paying off most of 
its foreign debt.95   The duress defense against the validity of the 
contract is therefore weaker for the PDL given the time and context 
it was signed.  However, the P.R.C. does have alternative contract 
law defenses against the enforcement of PDL, namely 
impracticability and the frustration of purpose.  Because contract law 
defenses are based on state law, we will determine the choice of law 
first and then elaborate on the defenses available to the Hukuang bond 
and the PDL, respectively.  
 
94 See DAI, supra note 10, at 315. 
95 Of course, paying off the foreign debt became impossible after the 
Japan invasion in July 1937.  See SUN DI, MINGUO SHIQI JINGJI JIANSHE 
GONGZHAI YANJIU (1927–1937) (民国时期经济建设公债研究 (1927–1937)) [A 
STUDY ON THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S PUBLIC DEBT (1927–1937))] 18 (2015) 
(stating that had Japan not invaded China, China’s foreign debt could have been 
paid off fully). 
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The Choice of Law 
Before diving into the specific argument of contract defenses, 
we first establish why New York contract law is likely to control for 
these bonds that have no choice-of-law provision.  Since New York 
federal courts follow New York state courts on the issue of choice of 
law,96 this section looks at common law principles and New York 
state court cases to address the question of governing law in our case.  
Other than the fact that New York law provides a better 
argument for the bondholders to toll the statute of limitations, 
plaintiff-bondholders are more likely to pick New York as their go-
to forum because its courts have demonstrated in the past a series of 
efforts to induce parties to use its laws and forum by promoting 
enforceability of contract provisions through legislation and the 
creation of specialized business courts. 97   There are many 
developments within the New York court system, for example, efforts 
to supply high-quality business courts, in order to give New York a 
leading position in the market for contracts.98  In addition, New York 
is very respectful of parties’ decisions, either explicit or implicit,99 to 
select New York as the forum and its law as the governing law.100  
In general, the choice-of-law rule in New York would lead us 
to “the law of jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation” 
based on the facts and contacts found in a specific case.101  More 
specifically, for contracts that do not provide a specific choice-of-law 
 
96 See Ancile Inv. Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 992 F. Supp. 2d 
316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Liberty Synergistics Inc. v. Microflo Ltd., 718 
F.3d 138, 151 (2d Cir. 2013) and Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)) 
(noting that a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in 
which the court sits to determine the rules of decision that would apply, and after 
using state conflict-of-laws principles to ascertain the rules of decision that would 
apply, federal courts apply those state rules of decision). 
97 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New 
York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in 
Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1481–87 (2009) 
(describing New York’s efforts to induce parties to use its laws).  
98 Id. at 1485–86. 
99 Compania De Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortg. Bank, 
269 N.Y. 22, 26–28 (1935). 
100 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for Contracts, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2087 (2009).  
101 Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382 
(1969). 
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clause, the test based on the “center of gravity”  or “grouping of 
contacts” most relevant to the contract enables courts to apply this 
general rule with more guidance.102  As opposed to focusing on a 
“single possibly fortuitous event,” a set of factors should be 
considered in this grouping analysis.103  This set includes:  (1) the 
place where the contract is made, including the place of negotiation, 
(2) the place of performance of the obligation, (3) the location of the 
subject matter of the contract, and (4) the domicile of the parties.104  
It is worth noting that these factors may carry different weights in 
courts’ analyses in different types of cases, but the general rule behind 
always stays true—to locate the jurisdiction that parties intend to 
submit to and that has the greatest interest in the litigation based on 
the particular set of facts.105 
The place where the contract is made is typically the place 
where the last necessary act in order to form a binding agreement is 
performed.106  As has been already noted, for the PDL, since the 
negotiation and signing of the agreement were in New York, it is very 
likely that the contract was made in New York.107  For the Hukuang 
 
102 In re Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81 N.Y.2d 219, 226 (1993). 
103 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. § 188 (AM. L. 
INST. 1995)). 
104 Id. at 227 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF L. §118 
(Am. L. Inst. 1995); see also FOWLER V. HARPER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 363 (1950) (stating different ways courts approach the conflict 
of laws issues in contract law). 
105 See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 5 
(1957) (emphasizing the place of contracting in automobile insurance disputes); 
Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 A.D. 383, 386 (1906) (holding that “[t]hese general rules 
are subordinate to the primary canon of construction, which requires that where it 
can be ascertained the intention of the parties shall govern.  Thus, though it may 
be stated generally that a contract is to be considered and determined under 
the law of the State where it was made, this rule is of no force in a case where it 
can be fairly said that the parties at the time of its execution manifested an 
intention that it should be governed by the laws of another State.”); see also 
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161 (1954) (“[T]he merit of [this] approach is that 
it gives to the place ‘having the most interest in the problem’ paramount control 
over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing the 
forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction ‘most intimately concerned with the 
outcome of [the] particular litigation.’”). 
106 HARPER, supra note 1044, at 363–64. 
107 DAI, supra note 10, at 175. 
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bond, this factor alone would point us to France.108  The place of 
performance is typically where the repayment is to be made.109  In the 
case of the PDL, New York will be deemed the place of performance, 
where the recoupment of the principal was supposed to be made. 110  
While the answer to this factor is less clear for the Hukuang bond, 
American banks actively participated in the initial issuance, which 
may suggest that the place of performance was intended to be the 
United States, at least for the portion of the principal amount assigned 
to the U.S. banks.111 
Perhaps what is more relevant to our case is not these specific 
factors, however, but rather the policy and state interest analysis in 
choosing conflicting laws, which are readily identifiable.  In other 
words, in contract disputes where the overarching goal is readily 
identifiable without the need to resort to specific factors, courts may 
feel comfortable engaging in policy discussions and relying heavily 
on the determined state interests.112   In J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. 
Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., which involves an international letter 
of credit that was valid when issued and later by virtue of subsequent 
governmental action became unenforceable in a foreign country, the 
court held that New York law should apply in order for the state to 
maintain its position as a financial capital of the world.113  The court 
also noted that where there was a conflict between the state public 
policy and the application of foreign law under the principle of 
 
108 Id. at 112 (stating that the Hukuang Bond was signed in Paris, 
France). 
109 See Duval v. Skouras, 181 Misc. 651, 653 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff’d, 267 
A.D. 811 (App. Div. 1944), and aff’d, 270 A.D. 841 (App. Div. 1946) (holding 
that payments are regulated by the law of the place of performance). 
110 DAI, supra note 10, at 315. 
111 See Id. at 112 (stating that the United States actively asked to 
participate and several U.S. banks issued the bond). 
112 See in re Allstate Ins. Co. (Stolarz), 81 N.Y.2d 219, 226–27 (1993) 
(noting that there are of course instances where the policies underlying conflicting 
laws in a contract dispute are readily identifiable, and that in those cases courts 
may properly consider State interests to determine whether to apply New York 
law). 
113 See J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 
N.Y.2d 220, 227 (noting that New York, as the financial capital of the world, 
serves as an “international clearinghouse and market place for a plethora of 
international transactions, such as to be so recognized by our decisional law,” and 
therefore “New York has the greatest interest and is most intimately concerned 
with the outcome of this litigation”). 
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comity, “our own sense of justice and equity as embodied in our 
public policy must prevail.”114  As previously discussed, the Hukuang 
Bond was partly issued by four U.S. banks,115 and PDL was issued 
by JP Morgan Chase.116  The fact that these bonds were issued by U.S. 
banks and to U.S. investors, coupled with New York’s longstanding 
efforts to make itself the financial center of the world, is likely to lead 
courts to find a prevailing state interest in this litigation.  
Similarly, the same facts suggest that the Chinese government 
made a deliberate choice to structure its commercial activities with 
U.S. investors.117  This may suggest the intent of the parties to submit 
themselves to the U.S. jurisdiction.118  Accordingly, it is likely that 
courts will read into the factual context as it demonstrates parties’ 
unwritten intent and honor it in court, especially when the outcome 
from this line of analysis would render the same result as an analysis 
of state interests.119  
In sum, we expect that New York to be the most likely forum 
for potential bondholder litigants.  It follows that New York law 
would also most likely be the governing law on the substantive issues 
that we will discuss next.120  
 
114 Id. at 228. 
115 Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1491 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
116 DAI, supra note 10, at 315. 
117 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) 
(noting that the issue of the case is whether the defendant's activities manifest an 
intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.  “In other words, the defendant 
must ‘purposefully avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”) (quoting 
Hanson, at 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228; Insurance Corp. at 704–705, 102 S.Ct. 2099). 
118 Id.  
119 See J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. 37 N.Y.2d 227 (“The parties, by listing 
United States dollars as the form of payment, impliedly accepted these facts and 
set up procedures to implement their trust in our policies.  In order to maintain its 
pre-eminent financial position, it is important that the justified expectations of the 
parties to the contract be protected.”). 
120 Our conflict of law analysis focuses solely on the substantive issues 
and skips over procedural issues, as it is well noted that matters of procedure are 
governed by the law of the forum and matters of substantive law fall within the 
choice-of-law analysis.  See, e.g., Matter of Frankel v. Citicorp Ins. Servs., Inc., 
80 A.D.3d 280, 285. 
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Duress Defense: The Hukuang Bond 
The P.R.C. would have a fairly strong argument against the 
validity of the Hukuang bond by citing economic duress because of 
the perilous position the Qing Empire was in when issuing the bonds 
to the U.S. banks. 
Economic duress is a common law doctrine.  Shifting away 
from a clear-cut common law version of duress, which was merely a 
by-product of tort and criminal law, “the extension of duress into the 
field of economic pressure began in the eighteenth century.” 121  
Courts have been compelled to take into consideration the issue of 
modern politics and the control of economic power.122  Especially 
with the expansion of industrialism, inequalities of bargaining power 
resulting from state-conferred monopolies were used to justify this 
extension of the duress doctrine.123  The economic duress doctrine is 
rooted in the theory that “agreement[s] in which one party has 
unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of another and 
thereby threatened to do an unlawful injury”124 are unenforceable.  To 
establish economic duress, the claimant must show that “the 
agreement was procured by means of (1) a threat, (2) which was 
unlawfully made, and (3) caused the involuntary acceptance of 
contract terms, (4) because the circumstances permitted no other 
alternative.”125  The party asserting economic duress has a burden of 
proof to show both an unlawfully made threat and causation between 
the threat and the involuntary acceptance of the contract due to lack 
of choice.126  Federal courts sitting in the state of New York generally 
look to New York substantive law in diversity actions and thus this 
section will focus on New York’s law of economic duress.127 
 
121 John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 
MICH. L. REV. 253, 253–55 (1947).   
122 Id.  
123 See id. at 259 (noting that the economic and political power of the 
railroads and many other types of utilities made them the focal point of the new 
doctrine). 
124 Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp. 2d 119, 127 (citing VKK 
Corp. v. NFL, 244 F.3d 114). 
125 Kamerman v. Steinberg, 891 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1989). 
126 Davis & Assocs. v. Health Mgmt. Servs., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114. 
127 KiSKA Constr. Corp.-USA v. G & G Steel, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9821, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2005). 
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First, the P.R.C. must show the Qing was under threat.  While 
courts have been insistent on demanding proof of the “unlawful”128 
aspect,  it is at least acknowledged that a threat to do what may have 
been lawful in the ordinary sense should be held unlawful if the threat 
is inflicted upon the complaining party in unreasonable cases.129  For 
example, in KiSKA Constr. Corporation-USA v. G & G Steel, Inc., 
the contractor was forced to enter into a subsequent settlement 
agreement with additional demands 130  due to the subcontractor’s 
threat to refuse to deliver bridge components and appurtenances 
under the original contract until the disputes were solved.131  The 
district court found that if the subcontractor had failed to deliver, the 
extra costs for the contractor to secure materials elsewhere and the 
anticipated delay of the project, which may have resulted in negative 
performance ratings and inconveniences to the public, were more 
than the press of financial pressures coupled with inequality of 
bargaining position, 132 and thus were sufficient to survive a motion 
to dismiss.133  The fact that the contractor was represented by an 
experienced construction attorney did not offset this deemed 
 
128 Kamerman, 891 F.2d, at 431.  
129 See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 
COLUM L. REV. 603, 608 (1943) (“When the damaging act is done for the purpose 
of bringing the other party to terms, courts which follow this doctrine will hold 
the act unlawful, even though in ordinary circumstances it would not be, if they 
think the terms insisted on do not justify the infliction of the damage.”). 
130 But see 4218 Partners LLC v. Maguire Ft. Hamilton LLC (In re 4218 
Partners LLC), 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 2203, at *12 (distinguishing the case at bar 
from KiSKA).  The court reasoned that the KiSKA court found an economic 
duress claim where the plaintiff argued that it was coerced into a settlement 
agreement with respect to claims that arose outside of its original contract with a 
supplier that threatened to suspend delivery of parts it was obligated to deliver 
under the original contract unless an “extra” term was reached.  The threat to 
suspend delivery was a “further demand” in relation to coercing settlement of the 
supplemental claims.  But in the case at bar, the court found that Defendant did 
not seek additional demands but only to alter the existing agreement.  Thus, the 
court could not plausibly find that the circumstances warrant the “extreme and 
extraordinary” relief of economic duress. 
131 KiSKA Constr. Corp.-USA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9821, at *4–6. 
132 Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of America, 397 F. Supp. 63, 
69 (noting that “[m]ere hard bargaining positions, if lawful, and the press of 
financial circumstance, not caused by the defendant, will not be deemed duress.”). 
133 KiSKA Constr. Corp.-USA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9821, at *17–18. 
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unlawful threat that caused the involuntary acceptance of settlement 
terms.134 
Second, what constitutes a lack of choice and free will is a 
difficult question.  The existence of choice cannot disprove the 
existence of duress.135  For example, a person who makes a deliberate 
choice to enter into an agreement when facing blackmail, while not 
deprived of his free will entirely, is not offered with meaningful 
options and thus under duress.  On the other hand, in most situations 
where the party has the ability to make a choice, courts tend to hold 
that there is no coercion or duress.136  
Bringing sovereign entity to the picture, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. denied the government’s 
argument that certain shipbuilding contracts made during wartime 
were made under duress.137  In rejecting the government’s argument, 
the Court relied heavily on the notion that the word “duress” “implies 
feebleness on one side, overpowering strength on the other.”138  A 
government, in the Court’s view, is typically too powerful to be 
subjected to duress by private individuals.139  More specifically, the 
Court pointed out that the Constitution grants Congress the power “to 
raise and support Armies,” “to provide and maintain a Navy,” and “to 
make all laws necessary and proper to carry these powers into 
 
134 It is not clear on the present record whether G&G had a clear legal 
right to require payment at the time and in the amounts so demanded.  Should 
G&G ultimately demonstrate that it was entitled on the facts and the law to 
demand a payment of $1.5 million from KiSKA before delivering the materials 
and furnishing the services necessary to complete the replacement bridge project, 
then G&G's conduct was not unlawful, and KiSKA's claim 
of economic duress will fail.  
135 See Union P. R. Co. v. Public Service Com., 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918) 
(noting that “the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not 
exclude duress”).  
136 See e.g., Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp. 2d, at 128 
(noting that “[p]laintiff undoubtedly had options other than signing the 
Agreement, such as pursuing his legal remedies”). 
137 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 301 (1942) 
(finding “no evidence of that state of overcome will which is the major premise of 
the [government’s] argument of duress”). 
138 Id. at 300. 
139 See id. at 305 (“We cannot regard the Government of the United 
States at war as so powerless that it must seek the organization of a private 
corporation as a helpless suppliant.”). 
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execution.”140  Under this authority, Congress can “draft men for 
battle service and draft business organizations to support the war.”141  
In other words, because the government could have foregone all 
negotiation and simply compelled Bethlehem to undertake the 
contract at a price set by the President, and it had the power to 
commandeer Bethlehem’s entire facilities in accordance with the 
authority delegated by the President, the Court found that the 
government acting through its agent was actually equipped with 
“bargaining power to which no ordinary private corporation can 
possibly compare”142 and was not deprived of choice. 
Moreover, even if there was a “traffic of profit,”143 here, the 
Court found that this was foreseeable when Congress authorized the 
procurement of ships through ordinary commercial negotiations.144  
In other words, the government must have known that the purchases 
could not be made in a market of open competition resulting in price 
and terms exactly at fair market value because existing shipbuilding 
facilities would be overtaxed by the construction program.145  This 
fact further supports the finding that the government entered into the 
contract voluntarily. 
In direct comparison to the situation of the U.S. in Bethlehem, 
Ukraine v. Law Debenture shows how the court may consider a 
government as a party vulnerable to duress.  There, the English Court 
of Appeal found that Ukraine had sufficiently alleged a duress 
defense against a Russian state-controlled lender for Ukraine’s 
default on a bond payment.146  Ukraine’s duress argument alleged the 
following.  First, Ukraine had an urgent need for a substantial amount 
of capital to fund its budgetary need.147  Second, other than Russia, 
 
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 303. 
143 The principle that courts of admiralty “will not tolerate the doctrine 
that a salvor can take the advantage of his situation, and avail himself of the 
calamities of others to drive a bargain; nor will they permit the performance of a 
public duty to be turned into a traffic of profit.”  Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150, 160. 
144 Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. at 304. 
145 Id. (citing Department of Commerce, Government Aid to Merchant 
Shipping (rev. ed. 1923) 433). 
146 Ukraine v. Law Debenture Trust [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2026, [181] 
(Eng.).  
147 Law Debenture Trust v. Ukraine [2017] EWHC 655 (Comm), [221] 
(Eng.). 
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Ukraine effectively had no access to the international capital 
markets,148 nor had it been able to raise funds from the EU, the IMF, 
or any other supranational institutions.149  Third, Ukraine was not 
able to raise sufficient funds in the domestic market in order to meet 
its needs.150  As a result, Ukraine alleged that it had no other choice 
but to issue a bond to Russia with unfavorable terms.151  Although the 
substantive duress issues had not been tried by the English court, 
Ukraine’s duress argument was found strong enough to go to trial.152 
The Qing Empire was very similar to Ukraine vis-à-vis its 
relationship to international investors and can be distinguished from 
Bethlehem.  The Bethlehem court’s main assumption that sovereign 
power is too powerful to be put under duress by a private party is 
inapplicable to the Qing Empire.  Both modern scholars and Qing 
statesmen have recognized that the Qing Empire had no choice but to 
work with colonial powers on public finance due to the absence of a 
modern banking system.153  The need for public finance was also 
largely the result of lost wars against invading colonial powers and 
maintaining defense against future colonial threats.  In fact, during 
the period of time between the First Opium War (1840) to the Xinhai 
Revolution (1911), about two-thirds of the government budget was 
spent on the military and payment to colonial powers for war 
reparations and other debt.154  
Without an effective infrastructure to borrow domestically, 
Qing had no alternative access to capital other than tax and tariffs,155 







153 See Harriet T. Zurndorfer, Imperialism, Globalization, and Public 
Finance: The Case of Late Qing China, at 12 (Working Paper No. 06/04), 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic-
History/Assets/Documents/Research/GEHN/GEHNWP06HZ.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MGH3-AVH5] (“All three kinds of these banks loaned money 
to the state which by the 1860s was in heavy debt, but which had no single 
financial institution to redress this situation.”).  
154  SUN, supra note 95, at 2. 
155 See generally id. at 5 (noting that the Qing Empire tried three times to 
issue domestic debt and failed to reach its fundraising target each time). 
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early 1930s.156  Before the National Government of the R.O.C. was 
established in 1927, the Chinese government would deposit a great 
sum of revenue from salt tax and tariffs to foreign banks as collaterals, 
amounting to around half of the annual government budget.157  The 
Hukuang bond’s collateral covenant is a good illustration of this 
history, where the collaterals to bonds were typically the salt tax 
revenue of the Qing.  The U.S. banks underwriting the bonds 
therefore presumably knew or should have known the level of 
dependency the Chinese government had on the West back then and 
arguably entered the transaction to take advantage of the borrower’s 
precarious financial and political position. 
Besides economic pressure, just like Ukraine, which was 
under military threat by Russia given Russia’s history of invading 
former Soviet nations, China was invaded by the U.S. before during 
the Siege of the International Legations.158  The lack of alternative 
sources of funding, coupled with the constant existential threat of 
military invasion, suggests that the Qing government was stripped of 
bargaining power to effectively negotiate with the counterparties and 
was deprived of choice.  This would support an argument for 
involuntary acceptance of contract terms as the circumstance 
permitted no other alternative. 
The Bethlehem court left it open as to whether it would find 
that the contract was made out of necessity and thus the government 
was under duress if the government was indeed in a helpless position 
as it alleged.  The answer to that is unclear from the case.  The 
majority of the opinion insisted that the negotiation itself did not 
show that Bethlehem forced the government’s representatives to 
accept the contract.159  The majority also found that in view of the 
 
156 XU YI, CONG BAINIAN QURU DAO MINZU FUXING—NANJING 
GUOMIN ZHENGFU WAIZHAI YU GUANLIAO ZIBEN (从百年屈辱到民族复兴—南
京国民政府外债与官僚资本) [From a Century of Humiliation to National 
Resurgence—Foreign Debt and State Capital of the Nationalist Government of 
the Republic of China] 279–80 (2004). 
157 Id. at 279. 
158 See R.G. Grant, Siege of the International Legations, ENCYC. 
BRITANNICA (June 13, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Siege-of-the-
International-Legations-1900 [https://perma.cc/NS7F-5M2D]. 
159 See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S., at 301 (noting that the courts 
below have found that “the contracts resulted from negotiations in which both 
parties were represented by intelligent, well informed and experienced officers 
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rising prices and unpredictable labor supply during wartime, 
Bethlehem’s demand on such terms did not seem unreasonable.160  
This line of reasoning suggests that assuming the complaining party 
has already been in a helpless position due to special circumstances, 
the court will look at the negotiation process itself and the 
reasonableness of the other party’s demand at such special time such 
as wartime to determine whether a contract is so coercive that it 
causes the ultimate involuntary acceptance of the contract terms and 
should be void on the ground of duress.  This in turn depends on how 
much the demand deviates from a fair market value in a normal 
market.161  Additionally, whether the other party has intentionally 
tried to take advantage of the economic necessities of another seem 
to play a role in court’s consideration.162  
While the Qing government was in a precarious negotiation 
position for its bond issuance, it is not clear whether the negotiation 
process was fair and the demand from U.S. banks was reasonable.  
However, if the P.R.C. government could show the severe unequal 
bargaining power between the Qing and the U.S. banks and the 
unreasonableness of the banks’ demand in court, the economic duress 
defense is likely to hold water.  
Finally, this defense has one weak spot:  it can be deemed 
waived by delaying in the prompt repudiation of the agreement and 
by ratifying the debt through partial interest and principal 
payments, 163  even if a party has sufficiently pled a claim 
of economic duress in order to void a contract under the Twombly 
standard.164  U.S. investors could counter with the facts that since the 
Chinese government later accepted the benefits of the contract, the 
government could not then claim duress even if the claim was 
 
whose sole object was to make the best trade possible, under conditions which 
included the uncertainties of war-time contingencies”). 
160 See id. at 302 (noting that representative of the government who 
approved these contracts “was of the opinion that high estimated cost figures 
would be advantageous to the Government because ‘care must be exercised that 
they be not placed at too low a figure, for if they are, the probabilities are that the 
contractor will lose interest in keeping the cost down’”).  
161 See Hale, supra note 129, at 624 (discussing the definition of what 
constitutes fair market value).  
162 See Mandavia v. Columbia Univ., 912 F. Supp. 2d, at 127 (citing 
VKK Corp. v. NFL, 244 F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
163 Sosnoff v. Carter, 165 A.D.2d 486, 491–92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
164 In re Marketxt Holdings Corp., 361 B.R. 156, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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otherwise meritorious and plausible. 165   In other words, the 
bondholders can counter this duress defense with further affirmative 
defense of ratification, which may occur via “‘intentionally accepting 
benefits under the contract,’ by ‘remaining silent or acquiescing in 
the contract for a period of time after [a party] has the opportunity to 
avoid it,’ or by ‘acting upon it, performing under it, or affirmatively 
acknowledging it.’”166  
If, however, the Chinese government could establish a case of 
“continuing duress,” it need not repudiate the contract until 
the duress has ceased.167  In fact, such continuous duress would even 
be able to toll any period of limitations if the Chinese government 
were to commence this action.168  The Chinese government could 
argue that the Qing Empire had been under financial pressure and 
continuous duress by the colonial powers even after being funded by 
the issuing of the Hukuang bond.169  It was impossible for the Qing 
Empire to try to repudiate the contract as it continued to be a 
government without adequate alternatives and a self-sustained 
internal financial system.  Although, by 1937, the R.O.C. government 
had largely cleared up its debt obligations from its foreign creditors 
and maintained a relatively healthy credit history as a new regime and 
a growing economy,170 the ensuing invasion by Japan in the same 
year destroyed any potential to keep growing the economy and 
government revenue.171  That said, historians have questioned the 
actual economic benefits of these bonds.  For example, John K. 
 
165 See VKK Corp., 244 F.3d at 122 (discussing applicable law regarding 
a judicial proceeding related to a duress claim pursuant to a contract). 
166 Id. at 123 (quoting In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455 
(1st Cir.1989)). 
167 Sosnoff, 165 A.D.2d at 492. 
168 See Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 458 (holding that when 
duress is part of the cause of action alleged, the limitations period is tolled until 
the termination of the duress) (citing Pacchiana v Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d 
721; Kamenitsky v Corcoran, 97 Misc 384, revd on other grounds, 177 A.D. App 
605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917); Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1219; Annotation, Duress or undue influence as tolling or 
suspending Statute of Limitations, 121 A.L.R. 1294). 
169 See SUN, supra note 95, at 18 (stating the statistics of the foreign 
bond, which had been mostly cleared up, and that had there been no foreign 
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Fairbank has pointed out the high interest rate and fees imbedded in 
these bonds, observing that these bonds in the end might not be net-
positive to the Chinese government. 172   This would imply that 
R.O.C.’s continuous acceptance of the terms under these bonds was 
largely due to its lack of choice other than maintaining its financial 
relationship with the colonial powers, rather than gaining actual 
financial benefits.   
This line of argument seems to be acceptable to courts.173  In 
some sense, the continuous duress argument holds water as the 
Chinese government had continuously relied on a sound financial 
relationship with the U.S. even after the R.O.C. government took 
power.  It is perhaps reasonable for the Chinese government to not 
repudiate the debt back then and only now as a defense argument to 
the bondholders’ action.  Compared to a typical short-term 
commercial contract, our case here is a long-term relational contract 
involving a government going through a complicated historical 
period.  Perhaps it is not proper to judge this case based on what 
constitutes a delay in ordinary contract cases.  Additionally, the P.R.C. 
was likely not on notice of the possibility of this lawsuit and had not 
realized the need to promptly repudiate the agreement by arguing for 
duress—from the outset the P.R.C may have viewed the repayment 
claims as unenforceable against itself.  The arguments that 
bondholders relied on to overcome procedural barriers only become 
available recently.  Altmann, which holds that FSIA could apply 
retroactively to overcome jurisdictional barriers, did not become law 
until 2004.  Similarly, the NML sequel, which makes tolling the 
statute of limitations possible for the bondholders, only came out in 
2013.  The P.R.C. may very well argue that its delay in initiating this 
duress shield is not unreasonable. 
 
172 See, e.g., id. at 214 (citing Fairbank’s comments on the high 
borrowing cost of bonds issued in the era). 
173 See Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.S.2d 2, 28 (finding that 
the delay in bringing action did not waive economic duress claim where the 
complaining party feared that “another stoppage of deliveries which would again 
put it in an untenable situation” and it was reasonable in waiting until after 
appellee’s last delivery to sue given appellee's conduct). 
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Impracticability: The Pacific Development Loan (PDL) 
The PDL was issued under a different circumstance where the 
issuer, the then-R.O.C. government, was in a much better shape than 
the Qing.  However, a different piece of history would afford today’s 
P.R.C. government impracticability defense to challenge the 
enforceability of the PDL in court.  This key historic episode is that 
the R.O.C. was a government friendly to and supported by the United 
States around the time when the PDL was issued, while the P.R.C. 
was a hostile regime to the U.S. from the beginning and fought a 
bloody war with the U.S. right after its establishment. 
Under New York Law, the defense of impracticability 
requires that (1) an unforeseeable contingency occurs, rendering the 
performance impracticable, (2) the nonperforming party must not 
have caused the contingency, and (3) the nonoccurrence of the 
contingency was a basic assumption of the contract when it was 
made.174  Given the uniqueness of the situation, we could not find 
case law analogous to our discussion, but the P.R.C. could at least 
assert a reasonable defense of impracticability given the general 
principle of the doctrine. 
A Series of Contingencies Did Happen to Make the Performance 
Impracticable.  
From 1937, when the PDL was issued by the R.O.C. 
government to 1953, when the P.R.C. Government refused to inherit 
this bond, a series of historical events had happened that transformed 
China from a country friendly to the U.S. to a hostile one.  The P.R.C. 
was dragged into a direct military conflict with the U.S. in Korea 
Peninsula and China’s economic, financial, and trade system had also 
shifted towards the communist system.  Under this regime, the P.R.C. 
had taken a radically different approach when dealing with foreign 
affairs from the global capitalism order of which the R.O.C. was a 
part when it issued the PDL in 1937.  Such a radical change, although 
initiated by the leaders of the Communist Party, was also necessarily 
a product of the international environment of the time.  At the dawn 
of the Cold War, the Chinese leadership found itself had no choice 
 
174 4C N.Y. PRAC., Commercial Litigation in New York State Courts § 
89:33 (database updated Oct. 2020). 
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but to fully commit to the alliance with the Soviet Union.175  These 
historic realities rendered a payment to U.S. bondholders by the 
P.R.C. impracticable in 1953.  
These contingencies were also in no way foreseeable.  At last, 
even to President Franklin Roosevelt, it was inconceivable in 1945 
that the Communist Party would have taken over China and built a 
Communist regime that committed to an entirely different set of rules 
in international finance.176  
The P.R.C. Did Not Cause the Contingencies (Alone). 
This part seems to be the weak link of the impracticability 
argument.  Although the P.R.C. government led by the CCP did 
commit the last few actions triggering the situation that rendered its 
performance impracticable, there were so many other factors leading 
up to this specific historical event.  For example, the U.S. could have 
maintained a much more friendly relationship with the CCP, but 
chose not to, after the Chinese Civil War.177 
 
175 See MAO ZEDONG, Farewell, Leighton Stuart, MARXISTS.ORG (Aug. 
18, 1949), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-4/mswv4_67.htm [https://perma.cc/L8NV-XUJW] (discussing the 
failure of American imperialism as represented by the departure of a United 
States ambassador who was supportive of cultural aggression in China); MAO 
ZEDONG, On People’s Democratic Dictatorship (June 30, 1949), 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-
4/mswv4_65.htm (“Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist 
front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine 
and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.”). 
176 See Arthur Waldron, How China Was ‘Lost’, WASH. EXAM’R (Jan. 
28, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-
standard/how-china-was-lost (“Davies’s China reporting had certainly been 
pessimistic about Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist government—which 
Franklin Roosevelt was determined should take its place as one of the “Big Four” 
after World War II—while consistently upbeat about the Communists, to whom, 
he forecast, ‘China’s destiny’ belonged.”). 
177 President Henry Truman attempted to negotiate peace between the 
CCP and the KMT before the Chinese Civil War and had given up on protecting 
Taiwan against the CCP attack after the war.  Truman only changed this policy 
and re-committed to protect the remaining KMT forces in Taiwan six months 
later when the Korean War began.  See Chen Yi-shen, The Korean War and the 
Fate of Taiwan, TAIPEI TIMES (June 10, 2010), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/06/30/2003476734 
[https://perma.cc/S4PX-QM4V] (“[O]n Jan. 5, Truman had announced that . . . 
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The Basic Assumption of the Contract Was Destroyed. 
The historical contingencies must also destroy the “basic 
assumption” on which both parties made the contract.178  Generally, 
the death of a person or destruction of a specific thing necessary for 
performance would excuse such performance for impracticality.179  
Here, of course, we have to stretch the common law to apply to the 
Chinese bonds in question because a party is a sovereign entity, and 
the relevant facts stretch across a century.  
The contingent historical events followed leading to 1950 had 
altered the basic assumption of the contract:  the PDL would help 
maintain a good relationship between China and the colonial Western 
powers, especially the U.S.,180 and such relationship was necessary 
for the issuance of PDL.  Such an assumption was essential to the 
contract and  was shared by both parties when the bond was issued:  
no U.S. investors would invest in China if the Chinese government 
was in a war with the U.S. and did not recognize the rules of 
international finance of the capitalist bloc, and the R.O.C. would not 
take on such debts but for this purpose. 
 
the US would not provide any form of military support or consultation to his 
forces stationed in Taiwan.  Truman changed his policy less than six months later 
when he ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait.”). 
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: IMPRACTICABILITY OF 
PERFORMANCE AND FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable 
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render that 
performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the 
contrary.”). 
179 See id. (“The continued existence of the person or thing (the non-
occurrence of the death of destruction) is ordinarily a basic assumption on which 
the contract was made, so that death or destruction effects a discharge.”).  
180 Our argument here is inspired by Prof. Mark Weidemaier’s discussion 
on whether Ukraine could use the doctrine of impracticality under English law to 
excuse its bond payment to Russian state enterprise when the bond indenture was 
signed by a former pro-Russia government.  See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, 
Contract Law and Ukraine’s $3 Billion Debt to Russia, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 244, 
248 (Jan. 2016) (“In some cases, a party whose performance has been rendered 
impracticable is permanently excused from the obligation to perform.  In others, 
the party is excused only temporarily.  Either outcome should prove acceptable to 
Ukraine; delay effectively amounts to a re-profiling of the debt.”).  
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As mentioned earlier, the PDL was part of the R.O.C.’s efforts 
to reorganize its debt with the colonial powers.181  It was the new 
bond issued to exchange for the old 1919 Gold Bond.182  Historians 
of Chinese public debt have long observed that the R.O.C.’s effort to 
reorganize debt purported to build the R.O.C.’s national credit to the 
colonial Western powers, as evidenced by countless statements made 
by the R.O.C. statesmen and commentators.183  In mid-1928, almost 
all of R.O.C.’s foreign debt was in default, and only through massive 
debt reorganization to restore confidence in the regime could R.O.C. 
regain access to the international capital market again.184  And by 
1937, when PDL was signed, R.O.C. was on track to paying off all of 
its foreign debt and its credibility in the international finance market 
had been well restored.185  The R.O.C. was successfully incorporated 
into the international capital market as of 1937 due to the successful 
debt reorganization by the KMT government. 
However, when the CCP defeated the KMT in the Chinese 
Civil War to establish the P.R.C. in 1949, the circumstances in China 
had changed dramatically.  The newly established P.R.C. did not need 
to go back to the international capital market which the R.O.C. was 
part of in the 1930s.  Mao and his government decided to ally with 
the newly emerged Communist bloc headed by the Soviet Union 
largely due to the hostility from the West.186  In fact, recalling the 
“who lost China” discussion in the U.S. after 1949, the KMT was 
financially and militarily supported by the U.S. during the Civil War 
 
181 See SUN, supra note 95, at 40–42.  
182 See DAI, supra note 10, at 314 (recording that the company that 
issued the 1919 bond went bankrupt and the 1919 bond was paid by the R.O.C. 
with a haircut in 1937 through an agreement between the then-Chinese Treasury 
Secretary Dr. H. H. Kung and the U.S. banks that issued the 1919 bond). 
183 See XU, supra note 156, at 120–40 (detailing the thinking behind the 
R.O.C.’s efforts to restructure its foreign debt by citing Chinese and Western 
commentators and statesmen’s statements at the time).  See also ARTHUR N. 
YOUNG, CHINA’S NATION-BUILDING EFFORT, 1927–1937: FIN. & ECON. REC. 23–
25 (1971) (summarizing the inception of the R.O.C.’s effort to restore credit). 
184 YOUNG, at 23–25. 
185 See XU, supra note 156, at 139 (illustrating that the Chinese 
sovereign bond prices in the Western capital market have gone up since 1930 and 
reached their peak in 1936). 
186 See MAO, supra note 175 (describing American foreign policy 
regarding China and the resulting need for alliance with the Soviet Union). 
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and the U.S. even started to engage in a direct military conflict with 
China in Korea in 1950.  
Unlike the R.O.C. in the 1930s, the P.R.C. was not a regime 
in need of maintaining a good relationship with the colonial Western 
powers and their private banks, nor would the U.S. banks lend the 
money to a Communist government in China that was at war with the 
United States.  The basic assumption of the bond issuance was 
therefore no longer in effect.  
In sum, the circumstances in early 1953 have deprived all 
practical means and reasons for the P.R.C. to pay its creditors in the 
U.S.  It would be nonsensical to imagine P.R.C. paying the investors 
of the U.S., with which it had a history of direct military conflict, and 
held different ideology and the accompanying economic, trade, and 
financial systems.  
The impracticality argument is not bulletproof, and a contract 
law argument built on so many dramatic historic events in the last 
century is more than unconventional.  However, the general 
principals of impracticality may just be enough for the P.R.C. to make 
its case against the validity of the PDL and add more roadblocks on 
the path of recovery to a plaintiff-bondholder. 
Public Policy against Enforcement 
The P.R.C. may also argue that the court should not enforce 
these bond contracts for public policy reasons.  New York courts 
typically will not enforce a contract, if its enforcement is contrary to 
the policy of the forum.187  Although it is not clear what policy courts 
would look at when making a particular decision, certain norms and 
principles upheld by the international community can be argued to 
have an impact on decisions by New York courts.188  
The conditions of valid treaties set up under the Vienna 
Convention provide that if the expression of a State’s consent to be 
 
187 See e.g., F.A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 254 N.Y. 407 
(1930) (“[T]o allow public service corporations by contract to absolutely exempt 
themselves from liability for negligence is opposed to the best interest of the 
citizens of the State.”). 
188 See, e.g., Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 
N.Y.2d 371, 378 (1963) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting) (noting that it is the national 
policy to co-operate with other Bretton Woods signatories to further promotion of 
international economic relations). 
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bound by a treaty has been procured through the corruption of its 
representative directly or indirectly by another negotiating State, the 
State may invoke such corruption as invalidating its consent to be 
bound by the treaty.189  Even though the Vienna Convention does not 
apply to our case as we do not have a treaty between States, this can 
be viewed as the international community’s acknowledgment that no 
sound relationship can start with and be based upon bad faith 
negotiations such as the induction of a State’s consent. 
Moreover, it is also worth noting that our case rests against 
the historical backdrop of developments in international law as the 
international community started to recognize the unequal bargaining 
powers among states due to the economic and political reality and its 
impact on legal relations.  The International Law Commission began 
to work upon the law of treaties in 1949 and during this period, 
developing countries had held a number of meetings to express their 
concern at economic pressure and their economic situation.190  The 
final Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or 
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, together with a 
Resolution requesting member states to give the Declaration the 
“widest possible publicity and dissemination,” suggests that the issue 
regarding economic duress and unequal bargaining power has been 
widely noticed at the international level.191  
While a Declaration has limited legal force, it can constitute 
an international obligation if it has become an integral part of future 
international law.192  Leaving legal force aside, a Declaration like this 
does influence international and domestic policy, as it demonstrates 
the value upheld by the international community.  While the debt in 
our case was incurred between a State and private parties, the state 
power behind those U.S. individual investors at the negotiation table 
 
189 In order to be a ground for invalidating the treaty, the corrupt acts 
must be shown to be either directly or indirectly imputable to the other 
negotiating State.  Christos L. Rozakis, The Conditions of Validity of 
International Agreements, 26 RHDI 221, 241 (1973).  
190 Cornelius Murphy, Economic Duress and Unequal Treaties, 11 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 51, 54–57 (1970).  
191 U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Final Act of the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/26, annex 
(May 22, 1969). 
192 See Murphy, supra note 190, at 61 (“The degree to which the Vienna 
Declaration will become an integral part of future international law depends upon 
the extent to which it is met with genuine acceptance.”). 
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cannot be ignored.  To hold the contract valid and free from duress 
challenge, the court might run against the public policy upheld at the 
international level that economic pressure can be an unethical form 
of conduct in this circumstance. 
All we seek to argue in this section is that there are plausible 
contract law defenses available to the P.R.C.  It would be very hard 
to predict how would these arguments fly in a federal court due to the 
uniqueness of the facts related to the litigation, but if the P.R.C. has 
the will to fight, it may have these arguments we have listed at its 
disposal. 
IV. CONCLUSION: TIME TO DIE 
To reiterate, this paper is an attempt to take a seemingly far-
stretched idea seriously.  Despite the immense intellectual joy that we 
enjoyed while writing this paper, we wanted to show why any legal 
effort to revive these bonds would be nonsensical. 
Even holding the two most promising antique Chinese bonds, 
the Hukuang Bond and the PDL, a plaintiff-bondholder would have 
an extremely hard time just surviving a motion to dismiss by citing 
the NML approach to toll the statute of limitations.  Even if in the 
unlikely case where a judge does toll the statute of limitations, the 
P.R.C. can still rely on contract law arguments to challenge the 
enforcement of these bonds.  How the court would treat these 
arguments is unclear.  What is clear is that any serious adjudication 
on these arguments would require courts to step into uncomfortable 
territories such as ruling on the political history of a foreign nation 
spanning a hundred years.  Given how unlikely a plaintiff would 
succeed in winning her day in court, devoting the limited resources 
of public discourse into these bonds seem to be unworthy, 193 
 
193 Commentators have expressed similar sentiment.  See Mark 
Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Enough with the Old Chinese Debt Already, CREDIT 
SLIPS (Sept. 10, 2019, 8:31 PM), 
https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2019/09/enough-with-the-old-chinese-
debt-already.html [https://perma.cc/XX97-GWX3] (“Still, the idea is crazy. Even 
if claims under these old bonds would suddenly be timely if assigned to the U.S., 
there is no practical way to use them to reduce the U.S. government’s payments 
on debt held by the P.R.C.  And the attempt to do so would likely violate 
regulations governing the Treasury’s issuance and payment of bonds.”). 
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especially at a time where much noise surrounds a deteriorating Sino-
U.S. relationship. 
As to the moral aspect of this issue where the bondholders 
claim that a sovereign debtor like the P.R.C. has the moral 
responsibility of repaying its debt,194  we can only stress that the 
history of sovereign debt is never one of moral clarity.  The U.S. also 
has a history of “dishonoring” its own obligations under unique 
situations.  It has repudiated its debt during the Great Depression by 
abrogating the gold clauses,195  and refused to inherit Cuba’s debt 
after annexing Cuba through the Spanish-American War.196  Granted, 
the factual situations of these two occasions are also complicated and 
the argument on whether the U.S. “dishonored” its obligations in bad 
faith is also muddy.  But this is exactly the point.  When major 
historical events intervene in how a sovereign has been conducting 
its affairs, the discussion on successor liability becomes so much 
more complicated than the simple moral lesson that one should 
always pay for its debt. 
This paper attempts to unfold those unique history episodes 
that we found highly relevant to the case and should be taken into 
consideration when applying legal arguments and sovereign debt 
doctrines.  Given the unique historical background and the delicate 
 
194 See Jonathan Garber, $1.6T in Century-Old Chinese Bonds Offer 
Trump Unique Leverage against Beijing, FOX BUS. (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/historic-chinese-bonds-trump-leverage-
beijing [https://perma.cc/63PG-7PD9] (reporting that American Bondholder 
Foundation President Jonna Bianco says, “the U.S. would have the weight of 
common law and moral responsibility on its side [against China].”).  
195 See generally Sebastian Edwards, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD 
STORY OF FDR, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD (2018) 
(detailing the history of American abrogation of various gold clauses).  See also, 
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935) (“The Constitution gives to the 
Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, an 
unqualified power, a power vital to the government, upon which in an extremity 
its very life may depend.  The binding quality of the promise of the United States 
is of the essence of the credit which is so pledged.  Having this power to authorize 
the issue of definite obligations for the payment of money borrowed, the Congress 
has not been vested with authority to alter or destroy those obligation.”).  
196 See Lee C. Buchheit, supra note 62, at 32–34 (“A particular point of 
controversy centered on certain loans that the Crown of Spain had incurred in its 
own name but for which it had pledged Cuban revenue streams.  Spain wanted the 
United States to assume responsibility for these debts in its capacity as the new 
sovereign power in Cuba; the United States was disinclined to do so.”).  
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Sino-U.S. relationship, the authors urge readers to seriously consider 
the effect of opening this Pandora’s box.  Drawn from examining both 
the history and legal arguments, the unavoidable conclusion is that it 
is the time to put this topic to rest and to let people simply appreciate 
the antique value of those bonds. 
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